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BROADENING LOW-WAGE WORKERS‟ ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE: GUARANTEEING UNPAID WAGES 
IN TARGETED INDUSTRIES 
Hina B. Shah* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fei Yi Chen worked alongside her mother at Win Fashion, one of 
three garment factories owned and operated by Toah Quan and Anna 
Wong.
1
  She sat on a box on top of her wooden chair to adjust to the 
height of her sewing machine.
2
  The factory had no windows and poor 
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Roberto Corrado, Charlotte Garden, Timothy Glynn, Tristin Green, Bill Hoerger, Michele 
Benedetto Neitz, Stephen Rich, Catherine Ruckelshaus, Marci Seville, Charles Sullivan, Rachel 
Van Cleave, Rebecca White, and Michael Zimmer for their thoughtful comments and 
encouragement on earlier drafts. Thanks to Nancy McGee for research assistance.  This article was 
selected for the Seton Hall Fourth Annual Employment & Labor Law Scholars‟ Forum, January 
2010.  This project was supported by the Golden Gate University Law School Summer Research 
Grant. 
 1. Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 256 (Ct. App. 2008); Interview by Russell 
Jeung with Fei Yi Chen, The Loss of the Garment Industry is Part of a Cycle: An Interview with Fei 
Yi Chen, Community Organizer for the Chinese Progressive Association, CHINESE AM.: HIST. & 
PERSP. 65, 65 (2008) [hereinafter Jeung].  The garment industry is structured as a pyramid, with a 
few large retailers at the top, selling billions of dollars in garments, followed by the second tier of 
garment manufacturers who sell and distribute finished garments to retailers and often design the 
clothes, and finally the sewing contractors.  See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor 
Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of 
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997 (1999).  Historically, garment manufacturers have 
contracted out their in-house production work to sewing contractors, whose function generally is to 
sew, press, and finish the cut fabric according to the patterns and instructions provided by the 
manufacturers. Id. at 997.  The sewing contractors staff their garment factories with unskilled and 
cheap labor, often immigrant, non-English speaking women, to perform the work for the 
manufacturers. See id. at 995-96; Jeung, supra, at 65.  The pyramid structure ensures rampant wage 
and hour violations. See Goldstein et al., supra, at 996-98. 
 2. Jeung, supra note 1, at 65. 
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ventilation indoors.
3
  She got paid by the number of pieces of clothing 
she sewed, and if she failed to meet her quota for the day, she had to 
clock out and continue working.
4
  Fei Yi Chen worked for the largest 
garment manufacturer in the San Francisco Bay area.  In addition to Win 
Fashion, Wong and Quan owned and operated two other factories, all 
closely-held corporations.
5
  The Wins factories employed approximately 
three hundred garment workers, all monolingual Chinese immigrants 
like Fei Yi Chen.
6
 
In 2001, the factories faced serious financial problems.  Wong and 
Quan knew that they could not pay their workers but nonetheless 
continued to operate the factories.
7
  They engaged in an elaborate 
scheme to mask the nonpayment of wages.
8
  For example, they 
personally instructed workers to delay cashing their paychecks, issued 
only pay stubs without corresponding checks, gave unsigned, and 
therefore, nonnegotiable paychecks, and issued paychecks that bounced.
9
  
The workers, despite not being paid any wages, continued to work at the 
factories.
10
  On a foggy morning in the summer of 2001, investigators 
from the federal Department of Labor and the state labor agency, the 
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, commonly known as the 
Labor Commissioner, raided the Wins factories.
11
  Amidst mounting 
pressure from creditors and the pending labor investigations, Wong and 
Quan padlocked the factories and declared bankruptcy.
12
  The workers 
abruptly found themselves out of work.
13
 
The DOL quickly entered into a settlement agreement with the 
 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 256.  While no one definition exists for close corporations, 
there is general agreement that a close corporation has a small number of shareholders who have a 
substantial portion of their wealth invested in the corporation, are intimately involved in the 
management of the corporation, and seek to restrict membership in the corporation.  FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 228-29 
(1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1151 
(1989). 
 6. Statement of Decision and Judgment, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 606, Bradstreet, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 3d  (Nos. A113760, A114106); Jeung, supra note 1, at 65. 
 7. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Transcript on Appeal at 329, 455, 867, Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Nos. A113760, 
A114106); Trial Exhibit 86, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 127; Trial Exhibit 87, 
reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 128. 
 10. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.  Wong and Quan misled the workers into believing 
that they had to be working in order to recover any owed wages.  Transcript on Appeal, supra note 
9, at 262-63. 
 11. See Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 258. 
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owners for violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”).14  Unfortunately, the agency‟s settlement fell far short of 
what the workers were owed.  The DOL settled for approximately fifty 
cents on the dollar.
15
  The Labor Commissioner pursued a separate 
lawsuit against the owners under state wage and hour laws.
16
  
Unsatisfied with the DOL process, the Chinese Progressive 
Association—a community-based organization—and two former 
employees intervened in the state lawsuit.
17
  California wage and hour 
regulations define an employer as “any person . . . who directly or 
indirectly . . . exercises control over the wages, hours, or working 
conditions of any person.”18  The lawsuit sought to hold Wong and Quan 
liable under this regulatory definition.
19
  After a four-month bench trial, 
the court issued a tentative decision, finding Quan and Wong personally 
liable to the workers for one million dollars in unpaid wages and 
penalties.
20
  However, the trial court did not enter judgment in favor of 
the workers because of the intervening California Supreme Court 
decision, Reynolds v. Bement.
21
 
In Reynolds, the Supreme Court of California held that the 
regulatory definition of employer could not be applied in civil actions 
under the California Labor Code because the legislature had not “clearly 
 
 14. Statement of Decision and Judgment, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 609-
10.  The Fair Labor Standards Act sets standards for minimum wages, maximum hours, and 
overtime law.  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206-207 (2006). 
 15. See David Lazarus, Garment Pact Called a Rip-Off, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2003, at B1 
(noting that the Wins‟ former clients agreed to pay $337,000 to the workers, and that Quan and 
Wong agreed to pay $213,000).  The owners never paid the DOL judgment. Transcript on Appeal, 
supra note 9, at 1112. 
 16. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257.   Congress specified that the FLSA was not to displace 
any state laws that provided greater protections than the existing federal standard. 29 U.S.C. § 218; 
see Brennan v. New Jersey, 364 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D.N.J. 1973).  At the time of the violations, 
California‟s wage and hour laws provided far greater protection to workers than under the FLSA. 
The California minimum wage was $6.25, compared to the FLSA‟s at $5.15.  Compare  History of 
California Minimum Wage, CAL. DEP‟T OF INDUS. REL., 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/MinimumWageHistory.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010), with History of 
Changes to the Minimum Wage Laws, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/-
coverage.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010).  In addition, California provides overtime for all hours 
worked beyond the eight-hour workday.  Overtime, CAL. DEP‟T OF INDUS. REL., 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/FAQ_Overtime.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
 17. See Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 256.  The Women‟s Employment Rights Clinic 
(WERC) of Golden Gate University School of Law represented the workers and the community 
organization.  I worked on the case while at WERC as a Visiting Professor and was lead counsel on 
the appeal. 
 18. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11010(2)(F) (2010). 
 19. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 257-58. 
 20. Id. at 258. 
 21. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Bement, 116 P.3d 1162 (Cal. 2005)). 
12 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:9 
manifested” its intent to apply the definition to the Labor Code.22  Since 
the Labor Code was silent as to the definition of “employer,” the court 
held that common-law agency principles governed the liability of 
individual corporate actors.
23
  As a result of Reynolds, Wong and Quan 
escaped liability.
24
 The trial court had ruled against the Wins workers on 
their veil piercing theory.
25
  After a seven year struggle, the Wins 
garment workers had no recourse against the owners, despite their direct 
involvement in the unlawful conduct. 
The California Supreme Court‟s decisions in Reynolds and 
Martinez v. Combs
26
 are not anomalies.  They are part of a broader trend 
among the state judiciary to curb legislative attempts to exempt wages 
from the limited liability rule.
27
  The Supreme Courts of Nevada and 
Colorado struck down their respective wage and hour definitions, 
holding corporate officers and agents not personally liable.
28
  These 
decisions fully embraced limited liability as the bedrock of the 
corporation, and required the legislature to manifest extraordinary intent 




Yet, unlimited liability has not always been viewed as such an 
extraordinary privilege.
30
  The idea that shareholders and other corporate 
actors should be held personally responsible for corporate acts and 
obligations had widespread support in America well into the nineteenth 
century.
31
  In the last decade, a robust academic discourse has been 
 
 22. See Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1169. 
 23. Id. (“Under the common law, corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency are 
not personally liable for the corporate employer‟s failure to pay its employees‟ wages.”).  But see 
Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 276-77, 279 (Cal. 2010) (holding that the regulatory definition of 
employer did apply to proceedings under the Labor Code, but did not reach individual corporate 
agents acting within the scope of their agency). 
 24. Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 258-59 (holding that under the common-law definition of 
“employer,”  Wong and Quan were not personally liable for unpaid wages and penalties). 
 25. See id. at 259 (noting that the workers claimed that Wong and Quan were the alter ego of 
the corporations).  The trial court also did not find personal liability under any of the other statutory 
theories, including the California unfair competition law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 
2008), and California Labor Code provisions specifically governing the garment industry.  See 
Bradstreet, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 259. 
 26. 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010). 
 27. See, e.g., Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo. 2008); Boucher v. Shaw, 196 
P.3d 959, 960 (Nev. 2008). 
 28. Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326; Boucher, 196 P.3d at 960. 
 29. See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 329-30, 332; Boucher, 196 P.3d at 963. 
 30. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability:  Vicarious 
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 337-38 (2004) (claiming that in the 
early 1800s, limited liability was not the main benefit of incorporation). 
 31. See id. at 338 (stating that limited liability was not necessarily provided by all states as a 
privilege of incorporation until the end of the nineteenth century). 
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taking place over the value of limited liability.
32
  There has been some 
recognition that limited liability places an unfair burden on some 
creditors.
33
  Numerous commentators have recommended reworking 
limited liability for tort victims.
34
  The plight of the wage creditors, 
however, has been missing from the academic discourse.  Wage 
creditors share some of the same structural problems as tort creditors.
35
  
They are involuntary creditors who have little bargaining power, and 
even less access to information to assess corporate risks.
36
 
In addition, low-wage workers face unique challenges not shared by 
other creditors.  Low-wage workers comprise one-third of the overall 
workforce.
37
  They work in industries with rampant wage and hour 
violations.
38
  A comprehensive survey of low-wage industries in New 
 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 361 (discussing the academic discourse over limited liability). 
 33. See Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical 
Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1090-91 (2009).  See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920 
(1991) (noting that shareholders of a corporation that experiences financial difficulty may seek to 
drain the firm‟s assets before contract creditors can levy on them).  There are essentially voluntary 
and involuntary creditors.  A voluntary creditor enters into contracts with the corporations and is 
assumed to have been aware of the risks of injury involved in dealing with the corporation.  See id. 
at 1920-21.  “Involuntary creditors constitute a residual category: those to whom the corporation is 
indebted on a non-contractual basis, as in the case of a victim of a corporate tort.”  Kahan, supra, at 
1090 n.24.  Workers fall somewhere in between. Employment is a contractual relationship, but 
structurally workers share the same characteristics as involuntary creditors. 
 34. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 30, at 416; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 1880; 
Kahan, supra note 33, at 1109-10; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1626-27 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1271 (2002); Robert B. 
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants 
for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1994); Note, Should Shareholders Be 
Personally Liable for the Torts of their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1196 (1967). 
 35. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 618 
(1986) (“Most employees and retail consumers and many trade creditors must properly be viewed as 
involuntary creditors. Consequently, the group adversely affected by limited liability is much larger 
than a group comprised only of tort claimants.”). 
 36. See generally id. at 616-20 (discussing the unfairness of limited liability protection for 
employees and labor claimants). 
 37. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC‟Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP‟T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., WHO ARE LOW-WAGE WORKERS? (2009) [hereinafter WHO ARE LOW-WAGE 
WORKERS?], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/LowWageWorkers/rb.pdf.  Low-wage workers 
are defined as those that fall below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they worked full-
time, full-year.  Id. 
 38. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:  
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA‟S CITIES 5-6 (2009), available at 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Cynthia Estlund, 
Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage 
Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 673 (2008).  In fiscal year 2008, the Department of 
Labor alone collected more than $57.5 million in back wages in nine targeted low-wage 
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York, Chicago, and Los Angeles recently found that more than 1.1 
million workers across these cities were deprived of $56.4 million of 
wages every week because of employment and labor law violations.
39
 
The limited liability regime leaves these workers with very little 
recourse when corporations file for bankruptcy, as they are increasingly 
doing.
40
  Workers can either rely on the stringent common-law veil 
piercing doctrine—a vague and confusing area of the law that courts are 
reluctant to utilize absent extraordinary circumstances—or statutory 
exceptions.  The FLSA has a broad definition of “employer,” holding 
corporate individuals liable under certain circumstances.
41
  However, the 
FLSA falls far short of providing comprehensive coverage to all workers 
due to its coverage limits and broad exemptions.  In addition, the FLSA 
definition focuses primarily on the control exercised by the corporate 
individuals.
42
 In the highly stratified Wal-Mart economy, many 
industries like garment rely on sub-contracting, diffusing control over 
several layers.
43
  Furthermore, FLSA‟s enforcement mechanisms are 
ineffective to combat abuses in low-wage industries. 
The need to restructure the limited liability rule as it applies to low-
wage workers‟ wages is more compelling than ever. As the Wins case 
illustrates, a simpler and more straightforward mechanism is needed to 
ensuring that low-wage workers recover the wages they earned. This 
article offers an in-depth analysis on the problems faced by wage 
creditors and sets forth recommendations for reform that would 
guarantee low-wage workers‟ wages, thus exempting them from the 
limited liability rule.  Part II traces the history of the limited liability 
 
industries—an increase of more than 77% from 2001. WAGE & HOUR DIV., EMPLOYMENT 
STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR  COLLECTS OVER $1.4 BILLION IN 
BACK WAGES FOR OVER 2 MILLION EMPLOYEES SINCE FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 3 (2008),  available 
at http://www.dol.gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf.  The targeted industries are: agriculture, 
day care, restaurants, garment manufacturing, security guard services, health care, hotels and 
motels, janitorial services, and temporary help.  See id. 
 39. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 6. 
 40. See AM. BANKR. INST., QUARTERLY BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY FILINGS FOR 1994-2010 
(2010), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Quarterly_Filings1&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=59342.  Business bankruptcies are increasing at an alarming 
rate, especially among small businesses.  See id.; see also Small Business Bankruptcies are Rising, 
NPR (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121746133. 
 41. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006) („“Employer‟ includes 
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and 
includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1, 16-17 (2010). 
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rule.  Particular attention is paid to the justifications for the limited 
liability rule, the effect of the rule on workers, and the current exceptions 
to the rule.  Part III discusses the genesis of wage and hour legislation as 
well as efforts to exempt wages from the limited liability rule under both 
federal and state laws.  Part IV presents a comprehensive analysis of the 
limitations of the existing frameworks, and Part V recommends a 
simpler and more effective mechanism to exempt wages from the limited 
liability rule. Specifically, the proposal seeks to guarantee wages for 
low-wage workers—creating a system of strict liability for wage 
violations. 
II.  JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIMITED LIABILITY  
A.  Development of the Rule 
The state has had the exclusive privilege of granting incorporation 
status for centuries.
44
  Scholars disagree on the precise origins of the 
limited liability rule, but most agree that the concept did not fully 
develop until the late eighteenth century.
45
  Limited liability was an 
extraordinary privilege granted to a select few.
46
  At first, legislatures 
granted the privilege to corporations with public functions.
47
  The push 
to extend limited liability to manufacturing companies gradually 
succeeded, first in New Hampshire in 1816, and last in Rhode Island in 
1847.
48
  By the 1840s, limited liability was more widely accepted as a 
tenet of corporate law.
49
 
Despite the trend towards limited liability into the twentieth 
century, there were significant jurisdictions that imposed some form of 
 
 44. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES 14 (2d ed. 1970). 
 45. See id.  See generally Blumberg, supra note 35, at 578-81 (discussing the emergence of 
the limited liability rule in England). 
 46. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, 
CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OR PARENT AND 
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 13 (1987) (noting that clauses prohibiting assessments beyond the 
amount of money invested as capital were becoming common in corporate charters, however these 
charters were difficult to acquire).  The early corporate charters dealt inconsistently with 
shareholder liability.  Some charters explicitly provided for direct liability of shareholders, others 
for limited liability and the remainder were silent.  See id. at 11-12. 
 47. See E. Merrick Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: 
Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1948). 
 48. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 33-34. 
 49. Mitchell, supra note 5, at 1165-66. 
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shareholder liability to protect creditors.
50
  Until 1830, Massachusetts 
expressly held corporate shareholders directly liable to creditors.
51
 
California imposed pro rata shareholder liability until 1931.
52
  Almost all 
states, including New York, imposed double liability between 1810 and 
1860 “in an amount equal to the par value of their shares.”53  Double 
liability for shareholders of bank stocks was common as late as the 
1930s.
54
  Even after states adopted limited liability, there were numerous 
attempts to revive unlimited liability.
55
 
Today, limited liability is the “unqualified and universal” default 
rule, either provided for explicitly in corporate statutes or by 
implication.
56
  The rule traditionally shields shareholders and other 
equity stakeholders from liability of corporate debts.
57
  If the corporation 
fails, they lose only the value of their investment.
58
  Officers, employees, 
and agents also enjoy limited liability stemming from agency 
principles.
59
  This article will use limited liability to encompass both 
shareholder and individual corporate actors. 
B.  Economic Insights from Empirical Studies 
The limited liability rule was developed to encourage and safeguard 
investors from the risks undertaken by the entity.  The “moral hazard—
the incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky 
activities to creditors”—was justified as a necessary evil for economic 
growth.
60
  Arguably, shifting the risks benefited the public by generating 
 
 50. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:3 (2010); Mitchell, supra 
note 5, at 1164. 
 51. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 33; Dodd, supra note 47, at 1357 (noting that the 
question of implied direct personal liability did not even come before the Massachusetts court until 
1809). 
 52. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 44-46. 
 53. Id. at 46-47; see Dwight Rogers & Donald F. McManus, Stockholders’ Booby-Trap: 
Partnership Liabilities of Stockholders Under Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1953). 
 54. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 47-48; Rogers & McManus, supra note 53, at 1157. 
 55. Blumberg, supra note 35, at 595.  Michigan, New Hampshire, Wisconsin and 
Pennsylvania repealed limited liability but soon reverted back to it.  See id. 
 56. See Glynn, supra note 30, at 339-40. 
 57. See id. at 340. 
 58. See id. (noting that shareholders were not personally liable for corporate debts and were 
assured protection from vicarious liability for the obligations of the corporation). 
 59. See id. at 341. 
 60. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 50.  See generally Richard A. Posner, The 
Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 501-02 (1976) (providing an 
investment analogy to demonstrate how a moral hazard can at times increase investment by 
reducing the borrower‟s risk). 
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greater economic activity.
61
  Equally important, limited liability was 
seen as democratic.  As Stephen Presser notes, “the imposition of limited 
liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small-scale 
entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets competitive 
and democratic.”62 
While the democratic goal has faded from history, the economic 
justification seems to have been uniformly adopted.
63
  Although there is 
not enough empirical data to fully evaluate the economic benefits of 
limited liability, several studies have called into question the impact of 
limited liability on economic development.
64
  These studies all 
concluded that substantial industrial development took place in 
jurisdictions with unlimited liability.
65
 
For several decades in the early 1800s, New England states were a 
patchwork of limited and unlimited liability regimes.  Massachusetts 
imposed unlimited liability until 1830, as did Rhode Island until 1847, 
while New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Maine offered limited 
liability.
66
  By comparing states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
with limited liability states in the early 1800s, the late Harvard 
Professor, E. Merrick Dodd, found persuasive evidence that unlimited 
liability did not deter economic growth.
67
  For example, Massachusetts 
was the leading cotton-textile state in the country at the time.
68
  In 1809, 
there was a substantial increase in the demand for manufacturing 
charters in the state.
69
  The same year, the Massachusetts legislature 
adopted a policy of imposing full unlimited individual liability on 
shareholders of manufacturing companies, which it followed for twenty-
one years.
70
  The adoption of unlimited liability did not deter 
incorporation in Massachusetts, and in 1830—the year the state adopted 
limited liability—there was no corresponding increase in 
 
 61. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 50; Posner, supra note 60, at 501-02. 
 62. PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:3. 
 63. Id.; see Blumberg, supra note 35, at 577-78.  See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 5, at 55-56 (analyzing the current economic structure of corporate law including the 
economic justifications for limited liability). 
 64. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 30, at 362-63 (acknowledging that several states, including 
Rhode Island and California, flourished during the nineteenth century despite not granting limited 
liability). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Dodd, supra note 47, at 1375-76 & n.92. 
 67. See id. at 1368, 1376. 
 68. See id. at 1352. 
 69. Id. at 1363. 
 70. See id. at 1363-64. 
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incorporation.
71
  However, Dodd concedes that limited liability had a 
substantial effect on large-scale businesses, as substantial additional 
capital was invested after 1830.
72
  Similarly, from 1830 to 1847, Rhode 
Island was the only New England state to impose unlimited liability.
73
  




California provides a more modern example.  It was one of the last 
significant jurisdictions to continue imposing unlimited liability into the 
early twentieth century.
75
  The California Constitutions of 1849 and 
1879 imposed pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for companies 
incorporated in California, regardless of where the debt was incurred, 
and for foreign corporations doing business in California for debts 
arising in California.
76
  In 1929, the legislature amended the Constitution 
to allow for limited liability of any California firm by a simple name 
change that included the word “Limited” or “Ltd.”77  In 1930, the pro 
rata liability provision was repealed and finally in 1931, a new corporate 
code passed the legislature adopting limited liability.
78
  From 1849 to 
1931, the effect of pro rata liability had no adverse impact on 
California‟s economy, despite the widespread adoption of limited 
liability in most states.
79
  California was ranked sixth in population in the 
forty-eight states and eighth in manufacturing output.
80
  In a study of 
share prices for California corporations traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and other stock exchanges during the time that limited liability 
was adopted, Mark Weinstein found no evidence of a change in share 
prices.
81
  Also, there was no significant increase in incorporation after 
 
 71. See id. at 1371. 
 72. See id. at 1373. 
 73. See id. at 1375-76. 
 74. See id. at 1376 n.94. 
 75. See Blumberg, supra note 35, at 597 (describing California as a place where shareholder 
liability survived until 1931). See generally Mark I. Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 1928-
31:  It’s the Lawyers, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 455-60 (2005) (discussing the liability regime in 
California). 
 76. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 42-43; see Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price Changes and the 
Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2003). 
 77. Weinstein, supra note 76, at 5-6. 
 78. BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 45-46; Weinstein, supra note 76, at 5-6. 
 79. Weinstein, supra note 76, at 19-20; see also Weinstein, supra note 75, at 455-60.  There 
were significant procedural hurdles in enforcing pro rata liability, which may have made it a remote 
threat to shareholders.  See generally Weinstein, supra note 75, at 457 (noting how foreign firms 
could only obtain limited liability if their company‟s name included “Ltd.” or “Limited”).  
Furthermore, waivers of unlimited liability were valid although it is unclear how often shareholders 
required such waivers from creditors.  See id. at 446. 
 80. Weinstein, supra note 75, at 455. 
 81. See Weinstein, supra note 76, at 7-19. 
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the adoption of limited liability in 1929.
82
 
Similarly, Peter Grossman, in his study of the trading of American 
Express stock from 1951-1959, debunks the prevalent view that limited 
liability is necessary for the functioning of the stock market.
83
  American 
Express Company operated as a pro rata unlimited liability company for 
115 years, from 1850 to 1965.
84
  This liability structure had no impact on 
share prices or in trading.
85
  In fact, American Express stock during this 
period traded actively, despite alternatives to invest in stock of 
companies with limited liability.
86
 
None of these studies definitively undermine the economic 
justification of limited liability.  In fact, for every case study like 
California or Massachusetts, commentators can point to jurisdictions like 
New York that experienced robust economic growth by adopting limited 
liability.
87
 Even Dodd conceded in his historical comparison of New 
England states that industrial development “would eventually have been 
seriously retarded if our legislatures had failed to encourage investment 
by limiting the investor‟s risk.”88  Yet, the rule is not the sine qua non 
for economic growth, as these studies indicate.
89
 
C.  Not All Creditors Are Equal 
Quintessentially, limited liability is risk allocation—shifting to the 
creditors and thus the public the costs of risks undertaken by 
corporations.
90
  The rule makes numerous assumptions about creditors.  
 
 82. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at 463-66. 
 83. Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The 
Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 85 (1995). The justification that limited liability 
was necessary for the functioning of the stock market is further undermined by the relative size of 
the stock exchange at the time that states adopted limited liability. It seems unlikely that the state 
legislatures considered the stock market a key reason for adopting limited liability.  It is equally 
possible though that while limited liability was not a necessary mechanism for the market, it may 
have played a role (along with other factors such as industrial growth) in the growth of the nascent 
market.  “In 1867, only 15 industrial shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.” JAMES 
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED 
STATES 72 (1956).  By 1896, the New York Stock Exchange traded 57 million shares and by 1901, 
the number was at 266 million shares.  Id. 
 84. See Grossman, supra note 83, at 73-75. 
 85. See id. at 76-77. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:3. 
 88. Dodd, supra note 47, at 1378. 
 89. See id. (stating that the factory system of industrial organization could have thrived under 
a legal system that denies limited liability). 
 90. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil:  An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL 
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It assumes that creditors are more efficient risk assessors.  They are 
deemed to have superior knowledge and are able to exact a price for 
limited liability.
91
  As Professor Roger Meiners points out, “[w]hen an 
individual contracts to limit his liability or has it limited by law, market 
conditions force him to pay a price for limited liability.”92  Thus, 
creditors can seek personal guarantees or additional security to 
compensate for higher risks.
93
  This paradigm only applies, however, to 
the contract creditor—a voluntary creditor that knowingly enters into a 
contract with the corporation.
94
 
It is nearly impossible for tort victims and workers to be efficient 
risk assessors or have leverage to negotiate a price for limited liability.  
Tort victims are unwilling participants and do not have information to 
assess a risk that they did not anticipate.
95
  Tort victims, thus, cannot 
bargain with the corporation to either avoid the tort or provide sufficient 
compensation to rectify the injury.
96
 
The wage creditor is most often equated with the contract creditor, 
as all employment rests on a contractual relationship—the selling and 
purchase of labor.  Wages are always paid in arrears and thus, the 
corporation owes a debt to the worker.
97
  Structurally, the individual 
wage earners are similar to tort victims.  They do not have bargaining 
rights equal to the employer and have little access to corporate 
information.
98
  To imagine that Fei Yi Chen, the monolingual Chinese 
Wins garment worker, could have, at the time of hire, asked for and 
received information about the Wins‟ finances, been able to understand 
 
L. REV. 1036, 1047 (1991). 
 91. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51; Posner, supra note 60, at 501-02. 
 92. Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 361 
(1979). 
 93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 501 (2001); see 
also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51-52 (explaining that if debtor firms cannot make 
credible promises to refrain from excessive risks, it must pay higher interest rates). 
 94. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 51-52. This market efficiency theory has been 
severely criticized for its inherent flaws.  Creditors are not necessarily risk averse. See id. (noting 
that the presumption that creditors are more risk averse is implausible; superior information can 
explain some, but not all, of limited liability). 
 95. See Kahan, supra note 33, at 1102 (“[M]any tort victims cannot forsee their injuries.”); 
Thompson, supra note 90, at 1071 (“[F]ew tort victims would choose the risks involuntarily thrust 
upon them by a corporation unable to pay for harm caused by its operation.”). 
 96. Kahan, supra note 33, at 1102. 
 97. Eric Tucker, Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada:  
From Conditions of Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 57, 
58  (2008). 
 98. See generally Blumberg, supra note 35, at 616-19 (noting that the dispositive inquiry for 
an injured party in a credit transaction is whether that party had the economic strength to bargain on 
the issue). 
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and assess the probability of corporate failure, and then negotiated either 
a higher wage or a personal guarantee based on the risk is incongruous 
with reality.  Corporations, thus, pay no extra price for the privilege of 
limited liability for wage debts.  Unfortunately, unlike the tort creditor, 
the inequality of the situation for wage creditors has not been addressed 
by the academy. 
D.  Current Exceptions to Limited Liability 
Absent contracting specifically for unlimited liability (usually by 
securing personal guarantees), there are two main mechanisms for 
contravening the limited liability regime: piercing the corporate veil 
doctrine and statutory exceptions to the default rule. 
Since the nineteenth century, courts have been willing to disregard 
the corporate form and pierce the veil to reach shareholders in an attempt 
to balance the benefits and costs of limited liability.
99
  In essence, courts 
have looked to a multitude of factors to assess when to disregard the 
corporate “veil” and hold individuals personally liable for corporate 
transgressions.
100
  There is no uniform application of the veil piercing 
doctrine from state to state.
101
  Thus, it has been described as “among the 
most confusing in corporate law” and a “legal quagmire.”102 
Robert Thompson‟s empirical analysis of all veil piercing cases, 
while dated, is useful in shedding light on when courts have used the 
doctrine to hold corporate individuals personally liable. Of the cases 
where the courts did pierce the veil, none involved a publicly held 
corporation.
103
  Courts were more likely to pierce the veil if the 
corporation had only three or fewer shareholders.
104
  The role of the 
 
 99. See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits 
of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1311 (2007).  There is a massive body of law and 
commentary on the veil piercing doctrine. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 50; Bainbridge, supra note 
93; Blumberg, supra note 35. 
 100. See Millon, supra note 99, at 1330-39 (explaining that while the factors vary according to 
state law, courts are more likely to pierce the corporate structure when one or more of these factors 
are present:  (1) fraud or misrepresentation; (2) using the corporation as an instrumentality, agent or 
“alter ego” for the activities of the dominant shareholders; (3) non-observance of corporate 
formalities; and (4) undercapitalization). 
 101. See PRESSER, supra note 50, § 1:1 (“[T]here has been a real reluctance on the part of 
courts to clearly define piercing the veil standards.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Thompson, supra note 90, at 1047. 
 104. See id. at 1054-55.  John Matheson & Raymond Eby argue that close corporations are 
more likely to not adhere to corporate formalities which make them likely targets for piercing.  See 
John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple 
Limited Liability Entities:  An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability 
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shareholder factored into the courts‟ analysis to pierce the veil.105  If the 
shareholder served as a director or officer or was otherwise active in the 
business, courts were more likely to pierce.
106
  In the few cases that 
described the shareholder as passive, courts almost always found no 
liability.
107
  Courts pierced the corporate veil significantly more in cases 
involving contract creditors rather than tort creditors.
108
 
Some legal commentators have concluded that the veil piercing 
doctrine is not an adequate vehicle to rectify the costs of limited 
liability.
109
  The multi-factored test varies from state to state and gives 
courts wide latitude in applying the factors.
110
  Veil piercing undermines 
the very predictability and certainty guaranteed by limited liability, as it 
is difficult to ascertain when courts will pierce the corporate veil.
111
 
In the Wins case, the workers produced evidence that Wong and 
Quan commingled assets, interchanging personal and corporate funds 
without any formality or approval process.
112
  In addition, Wong and 
Quan operated their corporations without adherence to any corporate 
formalities.
113
  Despite this evidence and supporting case law, the trial 
court did not find alter ego liability.
114
  As Stephen Bainbridge observed, 
the veil piercing doctrine “allows judges to impose their own brand of 
rough justice without being overly concerned with precedent or appellate 
review.”115 
While debate continues as to the effectiveness of the veil piercing 
doctrine, in the last several decades, Congress adopted explicit statutory 
 
Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2000). 
 105. See Thompson, supra note 90, at 1056. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1058.  While Thompson explains that some of the statistical differences are 
attributed to the court‟s willingness to pierce in misrepresentation cases, he concludes that even 
when removing these cases, courts pierced the veil more often in contract than tort cases.  Id. at 
1069. 
 109. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 514-15; Glynn, supra note 30, at 351. 
 110. See Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYO. L. REV. 551, 555-58 
(2009) (explaining the limited liability judicial approach). 
 111. See id. at 558; Glynn, supra note 30, at 349. 
 112. Tentative Statement of Decision, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 523-24. 
 113. Id. at 525. 
 114. Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 267 (Ct. App. 2008).  On similar facts, the 
California Supreme Court pierced the corporate veil of a family corporation where mother and son 
had entered into a large number of personal transactions with the corporations.  Riddle v. 
Leuschner, 335 P.2d 107, 109 (Cal. 1959).  The pair borrowed money from or lent money to the 
corporations without any formal approval by the corporations‟ directors or stockholders.  Id.  The 
assets of the two corporations were intermingled to suit the needs of the family.  See id.  The court 
found that the family pierced the corporate veil because they dominated and controlled the 
corporations, and that there was no separation between them and the corporations.  Id. at 110-12. 
 115. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 515. 
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mechanisms to override the limited liability rule.
116
  One key area that 
the federal government and some states have carved out of the limited 
liability rule is workers‟ wages.  The policy justification for exempting 
wages from limited liability stems from the special nature of the wage 
debt.  However, wages were not always protected under the law. 
III.  WAGES: TOWARDS MINIMUM STANDARDS  
AND SPECIAL PROTECTION 
Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy . . . . At 
his day thou shalt give him his hire . . . lest he cry against thee unto the 
LORD: and it be sin unto thee.
117
 
Since antiquity, wages have been considered special debts because 
of the unique nature of the labor contract.
118
  Workers provide a value to 
their employer in exchange for wages, which they depend on for their 
survival.
119
  Labor conditions have changed very little for workers at the 
bottom—they perform the same repetitive tasks for wages that barely 
meet their minimum needs.
120
  Without legislative intervention, low-
wage workers suffered exploitative conditions and substandard wages 
due to the employers‟ superior bargaining power, causing detriment not 
only to their welfare but also to the public.
121
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization, the 
influx of new immigrants, and the shift to factory production further 
 
 116. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006) (imposing joint liability 
on every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under the act); Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2006) (making any person required to comply with the 
collection and payment of payroll taxes personally liable for violations); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006) 
(imposing strict liability on owners or operators of any facility involved in the violation). 
 117. Deuteronomy 24:14-15 (King James). 
 118. See Tucker, supra note 97, at 58 (explaining that wages are special because they are paid 
in arrears, and are normally used to support the workers and their dependents). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 58 (1987) (“[T]he men who wielded 
shovels and pushed wheelbarrows on twentieth-century construction projects bore an uncanny 
resemblance to those who had dug canals and erected fortifications two hundred years earlier. . . . 
They exchanged simple physical force for a daily wage, whose level changed only gradually over 
the course of the nineteenth century.”); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 20 (2000). 
 121. See Harris, supra note 120, at 20. 
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exacerbated working conditions for low-wage workers. 
122
  A national 
movement emerged advocating for national and state legislation limiting 
hours of work and setting a living wage.
123
 
A.  Genesis of Wage and Hour Legislation 
One tool at the disposal of the states was the police power.  The 
judiciary had long recognized the inherent power of the states to regulate 
in the interest of the public‟s safety, health, morals, and general 
welfare.
124
  Prior to 1870, the states sparingly utilized their police 
powers to pass social legislation.
125
  In the 1880s, however, states began 
to broadly exercise its power, especially in the arena of employment.
126
 
As mining and manufacturing industries developed, every state passed 
legislation regulating the health and safety of the workplace in some 
manner. For instance, lawmakers regulated fire escapes in large 
buildings including factories, protected workers from accidental contact 
with dangerous machinery, and ensured the cleanliness and ventilation 
of working rooms.
127
  States also began to affirmatively set maximum 
hours and minimum wages, first for women and children, and eventually 




 122. See HURST, supra note 83, at 71-72.  The non-agricultural labor force more than doubled 
in a century from 28% in 1820 to 62% by 1900.  Id. at 71. 
 123. See Michael J. Goldberg, Law, Labor, and the Mainstream Press:  Labor Day 
Commentaries on Labor and Employment Law, 15 LAB. LAW. 93, 122 (1999); see also 
MONTGOMERY, supra note 120, at 195-96 (noting popular enthusiasm for the eight-hour workday); 
Harris, supra note 120, at 46-48 (discussing the American minimum wage campaign).  Even the 
Catholic Church weighed in on the side of worker protective legislation.  See Harris, supra note 
120, at 39.  In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued the Rerum Novarum, an influential Catholic doctrine on 
the working classes acknowledging the place for government regulation over working conditions. 
Id. at 39 n.99.  John Ryan, a priest influenced by the Rerum Novarum‟s call for reform, joined the 
living wage movement and agitated for government protection. See id. at 40.  In a 1900 article in the 
Catholic World, Ryan stated that “[t]here can be no freedom of contract between laborers who must 
work today or starve and a capitalist who may pay the wages demanded or wait until hunger 
compels the men to submit.”  Id. at 41. 
 124. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387-88 (1898). 
 125. See HURST, supra note 83, at 76, 97.  See generally Holden, 169 U.S. at 392-93 
(describing the lack of regulation on the coal mining and iron manufacturing industries since 1716 
because of the primitive methods and limited nature of these industries). 
 126. See HURST, supra note 83, at 97.  See generally Holden, 169 U.S. at 387 (noting that 
states have exercised the power to change their own laws with increasing frequency and that the 
laws will no doubt be affected by how society views the relationship between an employer and 
employee). 
 127. See Holden, 169 U.S. at 393-94. 
 128. See William P. Quigley, “A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work”: Time to Raise and 
Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY‟S L.J. 513, 516 (1996) (noting that Massachusetts passed 
the first minimum wage law for women and children in 1912); see also Harris, supra note 120, at 
59-60 (noting that in 1908, Massachusetts passed the first law imposing a fifty-six hour workweek).  
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The Supreme Court closely scrutinized worker-protective 
legislation through the narrow prism of individual contract rights.
129
  
Contracts for employment were squarely within the liberty interest and 
the Supreme Court derided state interference.
130
  The Constitution 
protected the “right to purchase or to sell labor.”131  Central to this belief 
was the judiciary‟s assumption that the worker was on equal footing 
with the employer in negotiating the contract: 
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems 
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor 
to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from 
the person offering to sell it. . . . In all such particulars the employer 
and the employé have equality of right, and any legislation that 
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of 
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land.
132
 
The seminal case, Lochner v. New York,
133
 overturned a New York 
law setting maximum hours for bakers.
134
  The majority placed a heavy 
burden on states to justify the exercise of its police power as 
reasonable.
135
  Much has been written about the Lochner era, a period 
roughly from the 1890s to 1940 where the Supreme Court frequently 
struck down wage and hour regulations.
136
  In 1923, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the District of Columbia‟s minimum wage law for women in 
 
After the 1912 passage of a minimum wage, eight other states enacted similar legislation the same 
year.  Id. 
 129. See generally Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (exonerating employers who 
violated a state statute designed to protect workers‟ right to unionize under the view that the state 
could not impede the liberty of contract between employers and employees.); Adair v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (reinforcing the right of a worker to sell his labor upon his own 
terms). 
 130. See, e.g., Coppage, 236 U.S. at 14; Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75. 
 131. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 132. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.  One commentator at the time retorted, “[w]hy do so many 
[judges] force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of 
inequality . . . ?  Why is the legal conception of the relation of employer and employee so at 
variance with the common knowledge of mankind?”  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE 
L.J. 454, 454 (1908). 
 133. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 134. Id. at 64-65. 
 135. See id. at 61. 
 136. Outside of the employment context, Lochner has been severely criticized through the lens 
of constitutional due process jurisprudence.  See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (1978) (seminal critique that coined the term “Lochner era” to 
describe Lochner and its progeny); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial 
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) (discussing the “Lochner era”). 
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Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.137  Following Adkins, the Supreme Court 
struck down several state minimum wage laws for women as 
“repugnant” to due process and struck down Congressional attempt to 
regulate wages and hours.
138
 
Frustrated by the restrictive view of the Supreme Court towards 
minimum labor standards legislation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
unveiled his “court-packing” plan on February 5, 1937.139  A few weeks 
after the “court-packing” plan was announced, the Supreme Court 
decided West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.
140
  In Parrish, the Supreme Court 
overruled Adkins and upheld a Washington state law setting a minimum 
wage for women and minors.
141
  Parrish, once and for all, ended the 
debate over whether the legislature had the power to fix minimum wages 
or impose overtime premiums for excessive hours.
142
  The next battle 
was over who was covered under these laws. 
B.  The Evolution of Individual Corporate Liability 
for Wage Violations 
Congress and some states went further than just safeguarding wages 
and creating minimum standards.  They recognized that the traditional 
master-servant relationship left too many workers without protection and 
no remedy when corporations failed. Thus, reshaping the employer-
employee relationship became central to some wage and hour legislation 
including FLSA.
143
  Under the common-law, the employment 
relationship was characterized as between the master and servant, 
wherein “the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the 
business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in 
other words, “not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.”144  
 
 137. See Adkins v. Children‟s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923).  The majority spends a 
great deal of time reviewing the breadth of cases dealing with state interference with contractual 
rights and concludes that there can be no justification for laws establishing minimum wages.  See id. 
at 546-53, 562. 
 138. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (striking down 
New York‟s minimum wage law for women); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 
(1927) (striking down Arkansas‟ minimum wage law for women); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 
(1925) (striking down Arizona‟s minimum wage law for women). 
 139. Harris, supra note 120, at 113. 
 140. Id. at 114. 
 141. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)-(e) (2006) (defining employer 
and employee). 
 144. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889) (quoting R.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 
649, 657 (1872)). 
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Too many workers fell outside the scope of the common-law test 
because of its singular focus on control over the work performed by the 
individual.
145
  The term employer was also narrowly construed to the 
entity that hired and contracted with the worker.
146
  For corporate 




There were two strains in the evolution of individual corporate 
liability for unpaid wages of workers—strict liability and control-based 
liability.
148
  In the late 1800s, legislatures experimented with creating 
shareholder wage guarantees.
149
  While very few of those laws survive 
today, California recently enacted a wage guarantee system in the 
garment industry.
150
  On the other end of the spectrum are the FLSA and 
some state wage and hour definitions of employer that hold corporate 
individuals, who exercise control over the entity or labor relations, 
personally liable for violations.
151
 
1.  Shareholder Surety Laws 
In the 1800s, vigorous debates about the usefulness of the corporate 
form and the limited liability rule ensued.
152
  Many state legislators were 
in favor of direct shareholder liability to protect creditors, but populists 
viewed the limited liability rule as a “mode of swindling” and “a fraud 
on the honest and confiding part of the public.”153  Central to the debate 
 
 145. See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1028-29. 
 146. See, e.g., State Div. of Human Rights v. GTE Corp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (App. Div. 
1985) (holding that defendant was still the employer because it hired the complainant despite 
payment from a third party). 
 147. See Mendelson, supra note 34, at 1211. 
 148. See id. at 1206-07 (discussing control-based liability); see also LORA JO FOO, ASIAN 
AMERICAN WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 70 (2003) (discussing 
attempts by garment workers to obtain a manufacturer‟s strict liability law). 
 149. See, e.g., S. HERBERT UNTERBERGER, GUARANTEED WAGE & SUPPLEMENTARY 
UNEMPLOYMENT PAY PLANS 15 (1956). 
 150. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West 2003). 
 151. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006). 
 152. Anti-corporate sentiment had two strains in the early discourse.  One group expressed 
wholesale opposition to the corporate form as a usurpation of public power, anti-democratic and a 
threat to the republic.  See WILLIAM ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL 46, 52-53 (1997).  Others rallied 
against the preferential treatment given to a few by state charter.  See id. at 52-53.  This group 
sought to pass general incorporation law as a way to “democratize entrepreneurial opportunities” by 
expanding the availability of the corporate form.  Note, Incorporating the Republic: The 
Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1887 (1989). 
 153. Matheson & Eby, supra note 104, at 154-55 (quoting THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON 
THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247, 250 (2d ed. 1830)); see also Mitchell, supra note 5, at 
1165. 
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was the issue of retaining unlimited liability for workers‟ wages.  New 
York considered the policy reason for why shareholders should be liable 
for wage debts. 
What class shall be thus favored, in whole or in part . . . ? Shall it be 
the farmer, the merchant, the blacksmith, the day laborer, the lawyer, 
the doctor, the carpenter, the mechanic of any kind?  No, not any one 
man, nor men in common, but the capitalists, and those of all others 
best able to pay their debts.
154
 
In 1848, New York adopted a very broad shareholder wage lien 
law: “The stockholders of any company organized under the provisions 
of this act, shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all debts 
that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, 
for services performed for such corporation.”155  Other states followed 
suit with similar language.  These laws varied, but in essence, they 
imposed strict liability on shareholders for unpaid wages incurred for a 
limited period of time.
156
 
Some laws imposing liability on shareholders for unpaid wages 
survived into the twentieth century.
157
  Tennessee, until 1969, held 
shareholders of manufacturing and mining corporations personally liable 
for unpaid wages of laborers and other employees.
158
  Pennsylvania had 
pro rata stockholder liability for employees‟ salaries and wages until 
1966.
159
  Michigan abandoned the constitutional provision for wage 
liability for shareholders in 1963 and repealed the statutory basis for 
shareholder wage liability in 1973.
160
  Wisconsin adopted shareholder 
liability for wages in 1849, and it survived until 2005 when the 




 154. Tucker, supra note 97, at 66 (quoting REPORT ON SO MUCH OF THE CONSTITUTION AS 
RELATES TO MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, S. 70-53, 17th Sess., at 3 (N.Y. 1847)). 
 155. Comment, Shareholder Liability for Wages: Section 630 of the New York Business 
Corporation Law, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 472 n.5 (1962) [hereinafter 
Shareholder Liability] (quoting 1848 N.Y. Sess. Laws § 18). 
 156. See generally Annotation, Who is an Employee, Laborer, or Servant, etc., of Corporation 
Within Statute Relating to Liability of Stockholders to that Class of Persons, 104 A.L.R. 765 (1936) 
[hereinafter Who is an Employee] (discussing stockholder liability for debts due to those employed 
by the company). 
 157. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50; see also Shareholder Liability, supra note 155, at 
472. 
 158. See Hand v. Cale, 12 S.W. 922, 922 (Tenn. 1890); BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33. 
 159. See BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33. 
 160. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (1908); BLUMBERG, supra note 46, at 50 n.33. 
 161. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0622(2) (West 2002); Assemb. 1163, 2005-2006 Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2006); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Shareholder Liability for Claims by Employees, 1984 
WIS. L. REV. 741, 741 (1984). 
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New York and Massachusetts are the only two states where laws on 
shareholder liability for wage claims survive in some limited fashion.
162
 
Most of the litigation surrounding the surety laws centered on the 
scope of coverage.
163
  Many courts viewed the surety laws as applying to 
a narrow scope of employees, those at the bottom-end who needed 
special protection.
164
  Most states abandoned the shareholder surety laws 
in favor of limited liability. 
2.  Broad Employer Coverage under the FLSA 
The FLSA has one of most expansive definitions of employer-
employee, neither restrained by common-law concepts nor restricted by 
contract.
165
  Under the FLSA, multiple simultaneous employers may be 
responsible for compliance.
166
  The FLSA defines an employer in a 
circular way as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
an employer in relation to an employee.”167  An employee is defined as 
“any individual employed by an employer.”168  Crucially, borrowing 
directly from the child labor statutes, the FLSA defines employ to 
include “suffer or permit to work.”169 
Under each of the FLSA definitions, courts have applied the 
“economic reality” test, utilizing several varying factors to determine 
 
 162. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630(a) (McKinney 2003) (imposing liability on the ten 
largest shareholders of non-publicly traded corporations for unpaid wages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
156, § 35 (2005) (imposing liability on shareholders for services rendered up to six months prior to 
the demand for payment). 
 163. See, e.g., Who is an Employee, supra note 156, at 766-73 (discussing several cases in 
which the court considered what class of persons the legislation was designed to protect). 
 164. See id.; Tucker, supra note 97, at 80-81. 
 165. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51 (1947); see also Rutherford 
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947). 
 166. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2009); Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 167. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006).  “Person,” in turn, is 
defined as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, 
or any organized group of persons.” Id. § 203(a). 
 168. Id. § 203(e)(1). 
 169. Id. § 203(g).  Child labor statutes were the first labor legislation to define employ to 
include “to suffer or permit.”  See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1015.  Historically, the “suffer or 
permit” standard had been widely used by legislators under penal statutes to impose an expansive 
affirmative obligation to prevent unlawful acts.  Id.  For example, an early eighteenth century law in 
Pennsylvania imposed liability on an owner who allowed his livestock to damage another‟s 
property.  See id. at 1015-16. In 1814, Connecticut forbade transportation owners or drivers to 
“suffer or allow” travel on the Sabbath.  Id. at 1024.  It was also used to impose criminal sanctions 
on persons who allowed unlawful conduct such as the illicit sale of liquor.  See id. at 1025. 
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coverage.
170
  With respect to liability for corporate individuals, courts 
seldom apply the “economic reality” test, focusing instead on the acts of 
the individual.
171
  The presence of one of these crucial factors will result 
in liability for corporate individuals: (1) operational control, (2) 
substantial role in setting personnel policies and/or control over the 
employees, and/or (3) knowing participation in the violation.
172
  While 
there is no consistent approach to trigger corporate individual liability 
under FLSA, the overwhelming majority of circuit courts impose 
personal liability where operational control over the day-to-day 
management and/or vis-à-vis the employees exists.
173
 
a.  Operational Control 
The seminal case, Donovan v. Agnew
174
 in the First Circuit, 
involved all three factors.
175
  In Agnew, two shareholders held all 
corporate offices and ran the day-to-day management of the company.
176
  
They had substantial control over personnel matters, including hiring, 
firing, and payroll.
177
 They paid other obligations and/or retained profits 
 
 170. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (identifying a four-
factor, five-factor, and seven-factor test, all active in the Second Circuit and applicable under 
different circumstances).  Interestingly, the “economic reality” test was developed under the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which did not explicitly define the employer-employee 
relationship.  See NLRB v. Hearst Publ‟ns, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).  In the absence of clear 
statutory language under the NLRA and the expansive scope of that statute, the Supreme Court in 
Hearst Publications rejected the narrow common-law test and adopted a test that looked at 
“underlying economic facts,” such as the degree of control, opportunities for profit or loss, 
investment in facilities, permanency of relations, and skill required.  See id. at 129-32.  Although 
Congress eventually disavowed the “economic reality” test under the NLRA as well as under the 
Social Security Act, virtually all FLSA decisions regarding coverage under the Act continue to 
utilize the test.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1992). 
 171. See, e.g., Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding an 
individual with no ownership interest who exercised significant control over employees liable); 
Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding a president, director, and principal 
stockholder who was not involved in day-to-day operation or supervision of employees not to be 
liable); Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that a 
nominal president had no stock ownership but met operational control test to be liable); Schultz v. 
Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1970) (“It makes no 
difference whether such person is a stockholder or officer of the corporate employer.  Indeed, it 
makes no difference whether the employer is a corporation or a natural person.”); Wirtz v. Pure Ice 
Co., 322 F.2d 259, 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1963) (finding that a 75% shareholder who lived in another 
city and had no knowledge of the corporate operations not to be liable). 
 172. See Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 173. See Sabine, 695 F.2d at 194-95. 
 174. 712 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 175. See id. at 1514. 
 176. See id. at 1511. 
 177. See id. 
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before properly compensating their employees.
178
  The First Circuit 
concluded, “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate 
officer with operational control of a corporation‟s covered enterprise is 
an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable 
under the FLSA for unpaid wages.”179 
In Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc.,
180
 the president and chief 
corporate officer was deemed an employer for having significant control 
over the day-to-day functions of the corporation, including controlling 
the purse strings.
181
  In another case, the owners, operators, and sole 
shareholders who exercised operational control over the company were 




b.  Control Over Employees/Labor Relations 
Some courts focus exclusively on control over the employee.
183
  
Relevant factors include whether the individual “(1) had the power to 
hire and fire employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work 
schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and 
method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.”184  
Whether supervisory employees can be liable has not been addressed 
consistently by the circuit courts.
185
  The First Circuit, in an oft-cited 
passage, rejected liability of mere supervisors. 
 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 942 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 181. See id. at 966. 
 182. See Ansoumana v. Gristede‟s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  Indirect control may also be sufficient.  See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 
194-95 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding nominal president of the company liable because he effectively 
dominated the company and indirectly controlled payroll, insurance, and income tax matters). 
 183. See, e.g., U.S. Dep‟t of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 184. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Cole, 62 F.3d 
at 778 (noting that chief executive officer with significant ownership interest who issued checks, 
maintained and controlled employment records, determined salaries and made hiring decision 
qualified as an employer under the FLSA). Nonetheless, the employee control test has been 
criticized as too narrowly appropriating the common-law agency test.  See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel 
Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 185. Compare Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1983) (requiring operational 
control to be liable as an employer), with Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(finding suit against a supervisory employee viable), and Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 
324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding a supervisory employee without ownership interest to be an 
employer). 
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[We do not] think too much weight can be put on the Act‟s broadly 
inclusive definition of “employer.” Taken literally and applied in this 
context it would make any supervisory employee, even those without 
any control over the corporation‟s payroll, personally liable for the 
unpaid or deficient wages of other employees.
186
 
In other circuits, supervisory employees without ownership 
interests were liable for FLSA violations.
187
  In Reich v. Circle C. 
Investments, Inc.,
188
 the individual defendant had a consulting agreement 
with the plaintiff‟s company, which excluded personnel matters from his 
responsibilities.
189
  He did not have any ownership interest and did not 
control the day-to-day operations.
190
  The Fifth Circuit, nevertheless, 
found him to be an employer, because he hired some of the workers, 
supervised workers and gave specific instructions to some, signed 




The FLSA definition of employer has not been adopted wholesale 
by states.  State wage and hour laws provide an additional layer of 
protection, and in some instances, provide greater protection than the 
FLSA.
192
 The lack of uniform treatment of corporate individuals among 
states leaves many workers without a mechanism to recover their wages. 
 
 
 186. Agnew, 712 F.2d, at 1513.  Rather, supervisory employees must have an ownership 
interest to be deemed an employer.  See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 187. See, e.g., Luder, 253 F.3d at 1022 (finding a suit against a prison official who supervised 
employees to be viable under the FLSA). 
 188. 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 189. See id. at 329. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. One in four states provide for a higher minimum wage than the federal minimum wage.  
See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm (last updated July 2010).  The federal minimum 
wage increased to $7.25 on July 24, 2009.  See Wages, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/index.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2010).  While the FLSA credits 
tips towards the minimum wage, some states guarantee the minimum wage regardless of tips.  See 
Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/tipped.htm (last updated July 2010).  A few states, such as California, 
Alaska, and Nevada, provide for daily overtime, while FLSA provides for overtime after forty hours 
of work. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, supra. Most states also afford additional 
safeguards that are not part of the FLSA.  These safeguards include immediate payment of wages 
upon separation of employment, payment of accrued vacation, payment of semimonthly pay 
periods, and treatment of fringe benefit contributions as wages.  See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 115/3, /5, /8 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.020, .030, .060 (West 2008). 
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3.  Piecemeal Individual Corporate Liability Among States 
As varied as corporate law is from state to state, the same is true for 
state wage and hour laws.  Under most wage and hour laws, there are 
two sections governing unpaid wages: wage payment and collection and 
minimum wage.  The wage payment and collection section focuses on 
prompt payment of wages, payment of wages upon termination, and 
private right of action for unpaid wages.  The minimum wage section 




Before the passage of the FLSA, few states embraced the scope of 
the “suffer or permit” language outside of child labor statutes.194  
Following FLSA, two-thirds of the states adopted the FLSA definitions 
for “employ” and “employer” under their minimum wage laws.195  
However, more than three-quarters of the states did not extend the 
expansive definitions to the general wage collections section.
196
 
In extending liability to corporate officers and agents, states 
generally define employer in one of three ways under the general wage 
 
 193. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4, /7, /12 (2008).  Some states include overtime 
premium pay under the minimum wage section.  See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, supra note 
192. 
 194. See Goldstein et al., supra note 1, at 1016.  In the early 1900s, the California and Texas 
wage boards—charged with investigating work conditions in various occupations and industries as 
well as setting minimum standards—used the “suffer or permit” language.  See id. at 1076. 
 195. Under the minimum wage laws, thirty states define employ to include “to suffer or 
permit” or “permit” and define employer to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer.”  An additional three states define an employee as an individual “suffered 
or permitted” to work.  Two states, Alaska and Florida, explicitly incorporate the FLSA definitions 
for minimum wage violations.  (A state comparison chart created by the author is on file.) 
 196. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-58(e) (2003) (The minimum wage statute defines 
employer as “any owner or any person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company or 
association of persons acting directly as, or in behalf of, or in the interest of an employer in relation 
to employees.), with § 31-71a(1) (The payment of wages statute defines employer as “any 
individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, . . . or assignee of any 
of the same, employing any person.”); compare D.C. CODE § 32-1002(3) (2010) (The minimum 
wages statute defines employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business 
trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee.”), with § 32-1301(1) (The payment and collection of wages statute defines 
employer as “every individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, . . . or the receiver, 
trustee, or successor of an individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation, employing any 
person in the District of Columbia.”); compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-201(a)(iii) (2009) (The 
minimum wage statute defines employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, 
business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee.”), with § 27-4-501(a)(i) (The wage collection statute defines 
employer as “any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, labor 
organization, . . . or the receiver, trustee, or successor of any of the same, employing any person.”). 
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collections act: (1) by enumerating officers and agents in the definition 
of employer;
197
 (2) by requiring scienter of officers and agents who are 
responsible for management of the corporation;
198
 or (3) broadly by 




The rationale for extending liability to officers and agents is 
captured aptly by the Pennsylvania State Appellate Court‟s interpretation 
of the definition of employer.  Under its general wage payment act, 
Pennsylvania explicitly enumerates agents and officers in the definition 
of employer.
200
  The Court stated: 
Thus, we see no logic in imposing the brunt of this financial fiasco on 
those so attenuated from the core of the fault as to be absolved from 
any wrongdoing, . . . and place the obligation on the shoulders of those 





 197. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-1(A) (West 2009) (“„[E]mployer‟ includes every 
person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, . . . and any agent or officer of any of the above 
mentioned classes, employing any person in this state.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-101(5) 
(West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-9-1(a) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148 
(2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.1(a) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-14-01 (2004); 43 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.2a (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-1(3) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
41-10-10(1) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-11-8 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-28-2(3) 
(LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(a) (2009). 
 198. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1101(b) (2009) (“[T]he officers of a corporation and 
any agents having the management thereof who knowingly permit the corporation to violate this 
chapter shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation.”); see also KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-323(b) (2009) (including major shareholders); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2 
(West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:42(I) (2010); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(m). 
 199. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.010(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2007) (“„Employer‟ is any 
person, either individual, corporation, partnership, agency, or firm who employs an employee and 
includes any person, either individual, corporation, partnership, agency, or firm acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”); see also ALASKA STAT. § 
23.10.145 (2009) (following the FLSA definition); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 408.471(d) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 177.23(6) (West 2009); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 39-3-201(5) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.2(5) (2010); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 
61.001(4) (West 2006). 
 200. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.2a. 
 201. Laborers Combined Funds of W. Pa. v. Mattei, 518 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986).  In Mattei, the corporation filed for bankruptcy after its bookkeeper embezzled a significant 
amount of money. Id. at 1297.  The corporate officers and 100% shareholders argued that since the 
fault lay with the bookkeeper, they should not be held personally liable for unpaid fringe benefits to 
union trust funds.  Id. at 1298.  Fringe benefits are considered wages under the wage payment act.  
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.2a. 
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4.  Guaranteeing Wages: California‟s AB 633 
California has long held the distinction of being the garment 
sweatshop capital of the nation.
202
  Labor advocates recognized that the 
existing legal frameworks did little to penetrate the industry‟s 
subcontracting structure, which ensured noncompliance with wage and 
hour laws.
203
  In 1999, after years of advocacy and targeted litigation, the 
California legislature passed AB 633, a historical bill negotiated by labor 
advocates and the retail and apparel industries.
204
  Of significance, the 
bill added section 2673.1 to the California Labor Code, which created a 
“wage guarantee.”205  Accordingly, garment manufacturers would be 
strictly and jointly liable for the proportionate share of the unpaid wages 
of their contractors‟ employees.206  In essence, the manufacturers 
became the “guarantors” for the garment workers‟ wages.207  Liability is 
simply premised on whether the manufacturer did business with the 
contractor during the time of the wage violations.
208
 
The guarantee can only be enforced through an administrative 
complaint process with the Labor Commissioner.
209
  The original 
language in AB 633 allowed for a private right of action to enforce the 
wage guarantee.
210
  The retail and apparel industries strongly resisted the 
inclusion of private enforcement.
211
  Labor advocates struggled over the 
political roadblock.
212
  After a decade of resistance, the manufacturers 
 
 202. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, REINFORCING THE SEAMS: GUARANTEEING 
THE PROMISE OF CALIFORNIA‟S LANDMARK ANTI-SWEATSHOP LAW 9 (Rina Chakraborty et al. eds., 
2005). 
 203. See Lora Jo Foo, Negotiating AB 633, The Garment Accountability Bill, 13 CAL. LAB. & 
EMP. L.Q., Winter 1999, at 5. 
 204. See id.; see also Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In:  Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles 
Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 45-46 (2009).  In the late 1970s, 
garment advocates pushed for broader joint liability for all manufacturers regardless of whether they 
used unlicensed contractors.  See id. at 44.  Instead, the California legislature passed a bill that 
required all garment manufacturers and contractors to register with the state and pass an exam to 
obtain a license.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2675(a) (West 2003).  In addition, the legislature imposed joint 
liability on any person engaged in garment manufacturing who contracted with an unregistered 
contractor for the unregistered contractor‟s wage violations.  Id. § 2677(a).  However, the law did 
very little to curb abuses because of the relative ease of registering and obtaining a license.  See 
Cummings, supra, at 44. 
 205. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1(a). 
 206. See id. § 2673.1(b). 
 207. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, supra note 202, at 6. 
 208. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1(b). 
 209. See id. § 2673.1(c). 
 210. Foo, supra note 203, at 5. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
36 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:9 
were agreeing to joint liability for unpaid wages.
213
  Yet, advocates knew 
the limitations of government enforcement and believed that private 
actions could bring reform to the industry more swiftly.
214
  Nonetheless, 
advocates agreed to take out the private enforcement language in 
exchange for additional provisions.
215
 
After the passage of AB 633, there was a sharp rise in the number 
of garment wage claims filed.
216
  From 1995 to 1998, approximately 565 
wage claims were filed by garment workers in California.
217
  From 2001 
to 2004, the number rose to 2,282.
218
  Six years after AB 633 passed, a 
report issued by the California Garment Workers Collaborative found 
that “[g]uarantors paid almost 30% of the total amount of money paid to 
workers.”219  Yet, ineffective enforcement by the Labor Commissioner 
of AB 633 remains the biggest hurdle.  The Garment Workers 
Collaborative report found that the agency failed to conduct adequate 




In the Wins case, despite the fact that the workers had filed 
individual claims under AB 633, the Labor Commissioner chose to 
bypass the administrative process.
221
  Instead, the Labor Commissioner 
filed suit against the owners under the more general regulatory definition 
of employer.
222
  Potential guarantors like Bebe, JCPenney, and Sears 
would have faced joint liability in the administrative process.
223
  The 
Labor Commissioner‟s decision to not pursue this avenue, in the end, 
undermined the recovery for the Wins workers. 
AB 633, much like the shareholder surety laws, provided for strict 
liability for unpaid wages.  But, it went a step further than the 
shareholder surety laws by holding an entity and/or person that did not 
directly employ the worker liable for the wage violation. The major 
 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 34. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE, supra note 202, at 19. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 20. 
 220. See id. at 26. 
 221. See Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 253, 257 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 222. See id. Wong and Quan were unique among garment manufacturers.  They owned several 
million-dollar properties in San Francisco and had the means and ability to pay any judgment 
against them.  See Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, Dep‟t of Indus. Relations, State Labor 
Commissioner Pays Nearly $1 Million in Back Wages to Garment Workers, 2 CAL. LAB. 
COMMISSIONER BULL., no. 2, at 2. 
 223. Interview with Marci Seville, Dir., Women‟s Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate 
Univ. Sch. of Law, in S.F., Cal. (Jan. 2010). 
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limitation of AB 633 is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor 
Commissioner in enforcing the guarantee. 
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORKS 
Holding shareholders and corporate actors personally liable for 
corporate debts is neither a novel nor untested theory.  Yet, the existing 
frameworks have done little to deter noncompliance with wage and hour 
laws. The problem lies both in the scope and breadth of individual 
corporate liability and enforcement. 
A.  Enforcement and Coverage of the  FLSA 
While the FLSA has been lauded for its expansive coverage, the 
law falls far short of covering all workers.  The FLSA has a host of 
exemptions, which carve out certain workers from the protections of 
minimum wage and/or overtime laws.
224
  These exemptions are broader 
than state wage and hour laws, exempting not only certain executive, 
administrative, and professional employees but also outside sales 
employees, home health care companions, and computer analysts to 
name a few.
225
  The result is that large classes of low-wage workers are 
not covered under the FLSA.
226
 
Furthermore, FLSA‟s individual corporate liability centers on 
operational control.  The singular focus on control fails to reach a whole 
host of employment relationships that rely on sub-contracting.
227
  
Garment, construction, and janitorial industries, for example, are 
structured such that control is diffused through several entities.
228
  Those 
at the top of the sub-contracting hierarchy dictate the conditions and 
price structures that result in violations at the bottom.
229
  The control test 
may not reach far enough up the chain to hold accountable those that set 
 
 224. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2006).  There are two types of 
coverage under the FLSA—individual and enterprise. See id. §§ 203(a), (r)(1).  Under enterprise 
coverage, only those businesses “whose annual gross volume of sales . . . [are] not less than 
$500,000” have to comply with the FLSA.  See id. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii).  Individuals who do not work 
for a covered enterprise may still be covered if they are engaged in or produce goods involved in 
interstate commerce. Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 225. See id. § 213. 
 226. Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 375 (2008). 
 227. See id. at 378-79. 
 228. See id. at 381-82. 
 229. See id. at 378-83. 
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the conditions for wage violations.
230
 
Compounding the limits of the FLSA‟s scope and coverage, DOL 
enforcement has been hampered by insufficient funding, lack of focus on 
enforcement, and ineffectiveness.
231
  From 1975 to 2004, the budget for 
DOL‟s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) investigators decreased by 
14% and enforcement actions decreased by 36%.
232
  The decrease in 
funding and shift in agency focus from enforcement to monitoring has 
resulted in serious impediments to enforcing the FLSA.  The 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) found that the WHD 
enforcement actions from 1997-2007 decreased by one-third, and 
enforcement actions were generally limited to individual complaints 
instead of entire industries where violations were suspected.
233
  
Furthermore, WHD failed to utilize the full panoply of remedies at its 
disposal, including assessing penalties.
234
  Finally, the WHD failed to 




In 2009, the GAO released a report on the inability of WHD to 
adequately investigate complaints from low-wage workers.
236
  “Posing 
as fictitious complainants, the GAO filed 10 common complaints with 
WHD district offices across the country. The undercover tests revealed 
sluggish response times, a poor complaint intake process, and failed 
conciliation attempts, among other problems.”237  The GAO 
investigation concluded that low-wage workers cannot rely on the DOL 
to effectively assist them in recovering wages.
238
  The Wins workers 
certainly felt that way after the DOL settled their wage claims for far 
 
 230. See id. at 380 (“Many companies seek to shift all employment-related responsibility . . . 
[by claiming] that they do not employ the workers and that the labor contractor is solely 
responsible.”). 
 231. See id. at 375-76. 
 232. See id. at 376.  WHD of the DOL is charged with enforcing the FLSA, including 
conducting investigations based on worker complaints.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, BETTER USE OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES 
AND CONSISTENT REPORTING COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE (2008) (reviewing the inadequacies of 
the WHD‟s enforcement). 
 233. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-962T, supra note 232, at 15-16. 
 234. See id. at 11. 
 235. See id. at 2. 
 236. See U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: 
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION‟S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW 
WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009).  Under Hilda Solis‟ leadership, the DOL is 
attempting to revamp the agency‟s focus.  See News Release, Wage and Hour Division, US  Labor 
Secretary Sends Message to America‟s Under-paid and Under-protected: „We Can Help!‟ (Apr. 1, 
2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20100411.htm. 
 237. U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, supra note 236. 
 238. See id. at 24-25. 
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Workers are thus left to enforce violations of FLSA on their own—
a daunting task for low-wage and immigrant workers. Most low-wage 
workers face significant barriers to effective redress.  Lack of access to 
counsel is one major obstacle.
240
  Low-wage workers cannot afford to 
hire private attorneys on an hourly rate.  Furthermore, their individual 




The nature of the FLSA class action is a further impediment for 
low-wage workers.  Unlike discrimination claims under Title VII, the 
FLSA has an “opt-in” provision for collective action.242  In essence, 
workers must affirmatively give consent to be included in any collective 
action.
243
  For many low-wage workers, the fear of reprisal from their 
employer and lack of understanding of the class notice prevents them 
from participating in FLSA class actions.
244
  As a result, the FLSA opt-
in provision results in lower participation by workers.
245
 
Because effective enforcement by DOL and individual workers is 
relatively scarce, corporations and individual corporate actors have very 
little to fear.  Thus, even the expansive definition of employer under 
FLSA has done little to deter wage and hour violations. 
B.  Judicial Limits on State Definitions 
While some states adopted definitions similar to FLSA to reach 
individual corporate actors, the state judiciary has been uncomfortable 
with attempts to override the limited liability rule.  Not surprisingly, 
where states have broad language holding corporate individuals liable, 
 
 239. See Lazarus, supra note 15. 
 240. See STATE BAR OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 7 (2008). 
 241. See id. For example, two out of three low-income clients in California with meritorious 
cases are turned away by attorneys for representation.  Id. 
 242. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).  To proceed in a class 
action lawsuit under Title VII, the party must meet certain class requirements.  See generally Gen. 
Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (“Title VII . . . contains no special authorization for 
class suits maintained by private parties. An individual litigant seeking to maintain a class action 
under Title VII must meet „the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
of representation‟ specified in Rule 23(a).”). Once the court certifies the class, all putative class 
members are included in the class unless they affirmatively opt-out. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2)(B)(v). 
 243. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 226, at 386. 
 244. Id. at 387. 
 245. See id. 
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courts have swiftly narrowed the scope of such expansive language.
246
  
But even where the language is more precise, state courts have curtailed 
or disregarded the plain statutory language.  For example, in 
jurisdictions that specifically enumerate officers and agents in the 
employer definition, courts read into the statute limiting language so that 
only high-ranking officers or only those officers who knowingly 
permitted the violation were liable.
247
 
Recently, a spate of state supreme court decisions have undermined 
principles of statutory construction and required extraordinary intent by 
the legislature to override limited liability.  In Leonard v. McMorris,
248
 
the en banc Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of liability 
under the Wage Claim Act for corporate officers and agents.
249
  
Notwithstanding the unambiguous statutory language, the majority 
engaged in a lengthy and unnecessary review of the legislative history, 
comparing employer definitions in other state jurisdictions, and 
expounding on traditional corporate law.
250
  The majority concluded that 
the legislature did not specifically manifest its intent to override the 




 246. For example, Illinois has two provisions for imposing individual corporate liability. 
Employer is defined to include any person acting “directly or indirectly in the interest of the 
employer.”  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2 (West 2008).  Furthermore, Illinois explicitly deems 
as employers any officer or agent who knowingly permits violations of the act.  Id. at 115/13.  As to 
the first definition, the Illinois Supreme Court found the definition untenable and wholly 
disregarded it.  See Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 838 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Ill. 2005). 
 247. See, e.g., Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund of Phila. v. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 
282 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that at a minimum, high-ranking officers are within meaning of the 
statutory definition); Mohney v. McClure, 568 A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff’d per 
curiam, 604 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1992) (holding that only officers who had an active role in the decision-
making liable); Dumas v. Infosafe Corp., 463 S.E.2d 641, 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that 
only agents or officers of a corporation who knowingly permit violations of the act are liable even 
though statute imposes liability generally on officers and agents). 
 248. 63 P.3d 323 (Colo. 2003). 
 249. See id. at 326.  The Colorado Wage Claim Act defines employer to mean “every person, 
firm, partnership, association, corporation . . . and any agent or officer thereof, of the above 
mentioned classes, employing any person in Colorado.”  COLO. REV. STAT. §8-4-101(5) (2009).  
Former employees of one of the largest privately held trucking companies sued the corporate 
officers under the statutory definition of employer for $12 million in unpaid wages, benefits, and 
other compensation.  See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 325-26.  The company filed for bankruptcy and 
ceased operating.  See id. 
 250. See Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326-32. 
 251. See id. at 333.  The majority gave little credence to the fact that the Wage Claim Act was 
amended in 1953 to add “agent” and “officer” to the definition of employer. See id. Furthermore, 
prior Colorado court of appeals decisions found the legislature to have been unambiguous about 
imposing individual corporate liability.  See Cusimano v. Metro Auto, Inc., 860 P.2d 532, 534 
(Colo. App. 1992) (“The definition of employer [in the Wage Claim Act] clearly discloses an intent 
to impose personal liability for wages on corporate officers. It contains no express requirements for 
liability beyond status as an officer.”). 
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The McMorris decision greatly influenced the Nevada Supreme 
Court‟s interpretation of its wage and hour definition of employer.252  In 
Boucher v. Shaw,
253
 a group of casino workers filed a class action 
lawsuit for unpaid wages against three officers and managers who 
controlled either labor or financial matters at the casino.
254
  Extending 
the rationale of McMorris, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that 
the Legislature had not “unequivocally” expressed a specific intent to 
extend liability to individual managers and agents.
255
  Thus, individual 




As discussed in the introduction, the California Supreme Court in 
Reynolds interpreted its wage and hour employer definition to apply only 
to administrative proceedings and not in civil litigation.
257
  The Labor 
Code does not define the employment relationship, but it provides a 
mechanism for private enforcement of unpaid wages including 
overtime.
258
  California‟s minimum wage and overtime regulations, 
called wage orders, do contain definitions that broadly define employ to 
include “suffer or permit” and employer to include “any person that 
directly or indirectly controls the wages, hours and working 
conditions.”259 
In Reynolds, the California Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff‟s 
 
 252. See Boucher v. Shaw, 196 P.3d 959, 962 (Nev. 2008).  Nevada defines employer to 
include “every person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or any 
employee.”  NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.011 (2009).  A person is defined as “natural person, . . . a 
corporation, partnership, association, trust or unincorporated organization.”  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 0.039 (West 2008). 
 253. 196 P.3d 959 (Nev. 2008). 
 254. See id. at 960. The casino had filed for bankruptcy.  See id.  The Ninth Circuit certified 
the question of corporate individual liability to the Nevada Supreme Court.  Id. 
 255. See id. at 963.  Originally, an employer was defined as “every person, firm, corporation, . 
. . agent, manager,  . . . or other person having control or custody of any employment, . . . or any 
employee.”  Id. at 961-62.  In 1985, the legislature amended the statute to its current definition to 
hold persons with control liable and, in turn, defined persons to include individuals and 
corporations.  Id. at 962.  No legislative history existed explaining the adoption of the new 
definition or why the legislature did not retain “agent” or “manager” in the definition.  Id. 
 256. See id. at 960.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that, while there was no individual 
liability under the Nevada statute, the workers stated a claim under the FLSA for individual liability 
and the casino‟s bankruptcy had no bearing on such individual liability.  Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 
1087, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.  Eight individual officers, directors and/or 
shareholders were personally sued along with the corporation for unpaid overtime wages.  Reynolds 
v. Bement, 116 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 2005). 
 258. Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1167 (observing that the Labor Commissioner is charged with 
determining the employment status of individual claimants). 
 259. Id. at 1168. 
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attempt to apply the wage order definition to his class action brought 
under the Labor Code.
260
  The court found that the legislature had not 
specifically expressed its intent to graft the wage order definition to the 
Labor Code, despite the fact that the legislature amended the Labor Code 
several times after the regulatory definition was adopted.
261
  Five years 
later, the California Supreme Court in Martinez reversed itself by 
holding that the wage order definitions did apply to Labor Code 
proceedings.
262
  Martinez went further and stated that the wage order 
definition of employer did not impose liability on individual corporate 
agents acting within the scope of their agency.
263
 Reynolds, however, 
never reached the scope of the regulatory definition, because it held that 
the definition did not apply to the claim.
264
  Nonetheless, the California 
Supreme Court in Martinez narrowed the scope of the wage order 
definition to not reach corporate agents. 
The judicial onslaught to defend the bedrock of corporate law 
undermines legislative efforts to realign corporate interests with labor 
rights.  These decisions roll back vital worker protective legislation.  The 




V.  THE NEED FOR GUARANTEEING WAGES 
Individual corporate accountability for noncompliance with 
minimum standards, which safeguard subsistence living, should be the 
cornerstone of wage and hour legislation.  The Federal Government and 
the states have enacted significant worker protective legislation to 
safeguard wages as special debts that must be paid promptly.  These 
statutory protections, however, are hollow without a remedy.  When 
businesses go bankrupt and corporate individuals are shielded from 




 260. Id. at 1169. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 279 (Cal. 2010). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Reynolds, 116 P.3d at 1170. 
 265. See id. at 1174-75 (Moreno, J., concurring). 
 266. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006).  The bankruptcy priority is an insufficient mechanism to 
assist workers in recovering all of their wages.  First, workers only have priority claim for a fraction 
of the unpaid wages—those earned immediately prior to the bankruptcy.  Id. § 507(a)(4) (noting that 
employees are entitled to a priority claim in bankruptcy proceedings for up to $10,000 in wages 
earned within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing.).  Second, many corporations simply have no assets 
for recovery, leaving workers unable to recover.  See, e.g., Bradstreet v. Wong, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
253, 262 n.8 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing corporate “shell games”).  Such was the case for the Wins 
factories.  See id. at 257. 
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During the long struggle to establish minimum wage standards, the 
Supreme Court finally realized that the burden of wage exploitation fell 
on society: 
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position 
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless 
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their 
health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon 
the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are 
called upon to pay . . . . The community is not bound to provide what 
is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.
267
 
The same rationale applies to workers who have no bargaining 
power to leverage personal guarantees or other premiums for the risks of 
limited liability.  Corporations pay no price for the risks they undertake, 
forcing society to shoulder the burden when they fail.  Thus, efforts must 
be directed at restructuring the very mechanism that deprives workers of 
their ability to recover wages. 
Because of the relative low bargaining power of the low-wage 
worker and the high noncompliance in low-wage industries with basic 
minimum standards, this Article proposes an expansion of the AB 633 
guarantor system to other low-wage industries, with an explicit 
mechanism for private enforcement.  The wage guarantee is no different 
than a contract creditor requiring, in certain circumstances, personal 
guarantees in their corporate dealings.  Because low-wage workers have 
no real bargaining power, Congress and the states should secure wage 
guarantees through legislation. 
The legislation should include a few key mechanisms that are not 
currently in the AB 633 model.  To have the greatest breadth of 
coverage, legislation should target low-wage industries.  Low-wage 
industries can be identified as those employing front-line workers (non-
supervisors, non-professional, non-technical workers) who earn less than 
85% of the median wage in their area.
268
 
Furthermore, the wage guarantee should not be limited to minimum 
wage workers.  The government identifies low-wage workers as those 
who earn below the poverty line for a family of four, even if they 
 
 267. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 
 268. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 56. While there are different methodologies used to 
identify low-wage industries, the approach by Annette Bernhardt and her research team in the most 
recent, comprehensive report on low-wage workers seems a sufficient means for identifying these 
industries. 
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worked full-time, full-year.
269
  Under the government‟s methodology, a 
low-wage worker makes an hourly wage of $10.50 or less.
270
  Workers 
who earn slightly more than minimum wage, but below the poverty line, 
are subject to the same exploitation and face the same vulnerabilities as 
minimum wage workers. Thus, the guarantee should encompass them. 
The model language for the wage guarantee should be as follows: 
To ensure that employees are paid for all hours worked, any person 
who employs or contracts with another person for the performance of 
goods or services shall guarantee payment of wages that are due to the 
employees performing the work. 
Furthermore, “person” should be defined as: 
Any individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited 
liability company, or joint stock association.  A person includes 
shareholders, any person with equity interest, and directors and officers 
of a corporation or limited liability company. 
The wage guarantee for targeted low-wage industries will do more 
to reform the flagrant disregard for basic minimum wage standards.  If 
individuals higher on the sub-contracting ladder are responsible for 
guaranteeing that workers be paid their wages, it is easy to imagine that 
better systems will be put into place to prevent or dissuade 
noncompliance with wages. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Nineteenth-century legislators protected creditors by instituting 
varying degrees of unlimited liability for corporations.  The early history 
of unlimited liability, particularly as applied to workers‟ wages, has been 
long forgotten.  Because of political necessity, rather than economic 
necessity, limited liability came to dominate legal jurisprudence.  
Flawed reasoning as to who could bear the risks more efficiently—
creditor or investor—helped excuse the unfairness of the rule. 
Aware of the possibilities for grave injustices to workers, Congress 
and some states rewrote the common-law rule.  The FLSA and some 
state wage and hour laws explicitly hold corporate individuals personally 
liable for wage violations.  However, these existing structures‟ singular 
focus on control fails to penetrate the structural problems in low-wage 
 
 269. WHO ARE LOW-WAGE WORKERS?, supra note 37, at 1. 
 270. Id. Using Annette Bernhardt‟s median wage methodology, a low-wage worker in New 
York makes $13.07 or less. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 56. 
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industries that ensure rampant wage and hour violations. 
Corporate interests have long dominated the development of 
corporate laws, undercutting other societal values.  For workers, 
especially those already toiling at the margins, the ability to recover their 
earned wages should not hinge on the corporate structure.  Two dual 
conditions make this legislative reform a paramount necessity: 
noncompliance with wage and hours laws has become rampant, and 
corporate bankruptcies have steadily grown.  Without legislative action 
and a uniform standard across all jurisdictions, workers like the 
immigrant women who worked at Wins will be left without any recourse 
to recover the money that is owed to them. 
The time for a simpler and more effective means to recover unpaid 
wages is upon us.  As California and earlier shareholder surety laws 
demonstrate, a wage guarantee system is neither a novel nor untested 
idea.  Low-wage workers need assurance that they will be compensated 
for their labor.  Guaranteeing wages for these workers helps to rectify 
the unfairness and inequity of the limited liability rule. 
 
